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CASENOTES
L a b o r Law-REVERSE POLITICAL
CHECKOFF
PERSE ILLEGAL
AS
VIOLATION
OF FEDERAL
ELECTION
CAMPAIGN
ACT, 2 U.S.C. 5
441bFederal Election Commission u. National Education Association, 457 F. Supp. 1102 (D.D.C. 1978), appeal docketed,
No. 79-1077 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 22, 1979).
C

The National Education Association (NEA), a voluntary
professional educators association,' maintains a Political Action
Committee (NEA-PAC) for the support of political candidates
and issues. In the past three congressional campaigns, NEAPAC has contributed more than one million dollars to candid a t e ~ In
. ~ 1976, the National Right to Work Committee filed a
complaint with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) alleging
that the NEA's funding procedure-a "reverse checkofYS in
which members objecting to the NEA's politics must request a
refund of their annual one dollar political contribution-violated
the rights of dissenting NEA members.' The NEA's Representative Assembly had approved the reverse checkoff procedure for
both dues collection and the funding of NEA-PAC.' Ruling on
cross motions for summary judgment by the FEC and the NEA,
the district court for the District of Columbia held that the NEA
had violated 2 U.S.C. 5 441b(b)(3)(A)6 because the reverse
checkoff procedure placed the burden of dissenting from the political contribution upon the individual association member?
1. The NEA was recently found to be a labor organization for purposes of the
Ladrum-Griffin Act. National Educ. Ass'n v. Marshall, 85 Lab. Cas. ll 11,172 (D.D.C.
1979). See also [I9791 800 GOV'TEMPL.REL. REP. (BNA) 23-24.
2. [I9781 787 GOV'TEMPL.REL. REP. (BNA) 10.
3. In a checkoff arrangement, employers deduct an employee's union dues from his
wages and forward them directly to the union. GUIDEBOOK
TO LABOR
RELATIONS
(CCH) 7
308 (1979). In a reverse checkoff system, dues or fees are deducted from an employee's
wages unless he indicates otherwise. The checkoff is a widespread union practice. J.
STIEBER,
PUBLICEMPLOYEE
UNIONISM:
STRUCTURE,
GROWTH,
POLICY131 (1973). See also
D. SULLIVAN,
PUBLICEMPLOYEE
LABORLAW8 16.6 (1969).
4. [I9781 771 GOV'TEMPL.REL. REP. (BNA) 16-17.
5. Approximately 10,000 delegates attended the Representative Assembly. Federal
Election Comm'n v. National Educ. Ass'n, 457 F. Supp. 1102, 1103, appeal docketed, No.
79-1077 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 22, 1979).
6. 2 U.S.C. 5 441b(b)(3)(A) (1976).
7. 457 F. Supp. at 1106.
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The court subsequently ordered the NEA to again solicit the
contributions for the 1974-75, 1975-76, and 1976-77 memberships years. Any member not affirmatively indicating a desire to
have contributed during those years was to have his pro rata political contribution refunded?

Federal labor laws provide a pervasive structure for the activities of labor unrons; virtually every facet of the labor movement is monitored, and the rights of labor unions expand or contract with statutory enactments. Because union rights are
generally conferred by statute, labor has a vested interest in the
political process. Yet Congress has limited union activities in the
very arena in which labor has one of its greatest interests. As
might be expected, this tension between government regulation
and labor union activity transforms the simplest union policies
into questions of political and constitutional significance.
While Congress and the courts have long concerned themselves with the solicitation and spending procedures of unions,
the resulting legislation has centered on two areas: regulating
campaign expenditures and giving unions the ability to raise
funds for their causes. Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley
Act-later section 610 of title 18-regulated union expenditures
in political campaigns.@Section 610 made it "unlawful . . . for
any corporation whatever, or any labor organization to make
a contribution or expenditure in connection with any [federal] election."1° Congress' primary concern in enacting section
610 was " 'the necessity for destroying the influence over elections which corporations [and unions] exercised through
financial contributions' ";I1 a secondary purpose was to protect
union members from the use of their involuntary contributions
for union political activities.12 Section 152 (Eleventh) of the
Railway Labor Act,lS unlike section 610 which was a criminal
8. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Educ. Ass'n, 99 L.R.R.M. 3463 (D.D.C.
1978).
9. 18 U.S.C. 5 610 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a)
(1976)). Section 610 derived from section 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, Pub.
L. No. 68-506, 8 313, 43 Stat. 1070, 1074 (1925).
10. 18 U.S.C. 8 610 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
11. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 80 (1975) (quoting United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106,
113 (1948)).
12. Id. at 81 & n.13.
13. Railway Labor Act 5 2, 45 U.S.C. 8 152 (Eleventh) (1976).
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statute," is a permissive statute conferring on unions a union- or
agency-shop privilege. Concomitant to the union-security privilege, the statute authorized a checkoff procedure for dues collection." Congress gave unions the power to raise funds to "[effectuate] the basic congressional policy of stabilizing labor relations
in the industry."16 Through union-security agreements, the unions could eliminate "free-riders9'-those who would enjoy the
benefits of union membership without contributing their fair
share of the costd7
In 1976 Congress amended the Federal Election Campaign
Act18 and codified new limitations on union and corporate political spending? Section 441b of the Federal Election Campaign
Act replaced section 610 and contained language virtually identical to that found in section 152 (Eleventh) of the Railway La14. Section 610 provides for fines of up to $5,000 for any corporate or labor union
violation of the act. Officers or directors of the organizations may be fined up to $1,000
and imprisoned for up to one year; willful violators may be fined up to $10,000 and
imprisoned for up to two years. 18 U.S.C. 3 610 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). No private cause
of action exists under section 610. Cort v. Ash, 422 US. 66 (1975).
15. Section 152 (Eleventh) reads in part as follows:
[A] labor organization . . . shall be permitted-

....

.

(b) to make agreements providing for the deduction by such carrier . .
from the wages of its . . . employees in a craft or class and payment to the
labor organization representing the craft or class of such employees, of any
periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments . . . uniformly required as a
condition of acquiring or retaining membership . . . .
45 U.S.C. 3 152 (Eleventh) (1976).
16. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 760 (1961). See also
Nolan, Public Sector Collective Bargaining: Defining the Federal Role, 63 CORNELLL.
REV.419, 456 (1978).
17. 367 U.S. at 761.
18. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 3 112,
90 Stat. 490 (1976).
19. The portion of the statute relevant here states the following:
It is unlawful for . . . any labor organization, to make a contribution or
expenditure in connection with any [federal] election . . . or in connection
with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates . . . .

....

It shall be unlawfulfor . . . a [separate segregated fund utilized by a labor organization for
political purposes] to make a contribution or expenditure by utilizing money or
anything of value secured by . . dues, fees, or other moneys required as a
condition of membership in a labor organization or as a condition of employment. . . .
2 U.S.C. 3 441b(a), (b)(3)(A). For an analysis of section 441b, see Comment, Corporate
and Union Political Contributions and Expenditures Under 2 U.S.C. $ 441 b: A Constitutional Analysis, 1977 UTAHL. REV.291.

.
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bor Act. Despite the fact that a union's political activities extend
from the collection of contributions to the expenditure of those
funds in a political campaign, the court decisions based on section 610 are remarkably distinct from section 152 (Eleventh) dec i s i o n ~ The
. ~ ~ potential conflict between the two lines of decisions and the effect the resolution of this conflict will have on
section 441b necessitates a review not only of the major cases
under section 610 and section 152 (Eleventh), but also a review
of the constitutional principles circumscribing the statutes.

A. Section 610 and Minority Interests
1. The influence of union political expenditures: CIO and

UAW
The first test of the campaign expenditure limitations of the
Taft-Hartley Act came shortly after passage of the Act in
United States u. CIO." Phillip Murray, President of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), had openly endorsed a
candidate for Congress in the union's newspaper. The Supreme
Court held in favor of the union and found that financial support of a regularly published union newspaper did not fall
within the statute's "contribution or expenditure" language, and
that the union could therefore use general union funds for intraunion political purposes.a2
In a concurring opinion, four justices found that the statute
was overbroad and infringed on first amendment rights." The
concurring justices granted that one of the reasons for the statute was to protect the political interests of minority union members, but reasoned that a statute so broad as to prohibit all political expenditures encroached on the majority's rights." This
would "deprive the union of the principle of majority rule in political expre~sion."~~
Less restrictive measures were available to
20. Comment, Of Politics, Pipefitters, and Section 610: Union Political Contributions in Modern Context, 51 TEX.L. REV.936, 955 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Politics
and Pipefitters].
21. 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
22. Id. at 123-24. No statutes or cases since CIO have dealt with whether any limitations exist on internal union expenditures for the promotion of a union political action
committee. See generally Comment, Federal Regulation of Union Political Expenditures: New Wine in Old Bottles, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REV.100, 127.
23. 335 U S . at 150-51 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 146-48.
25. Id. at 149.

'
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protect the minority's rights.26
Almost a decade after CIO, the Court in United States v.
UAW2' again ruled on section 610, and again the majority sidestepped the main issues. The indictment stated that the United
Auto Workers (UAW) had paid for a television broadcast supporting certain congressional candidates. The district court dismissed the indictment for having failed to state an offense under
the statute. Reciting the statute's legislative history, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the indictment stated a statutory cause of action because the UAW might have used general
funds to finance extra-union political activities. The Court declined to discuss the constitutional issues, but noted that the
"case . . . raise[d] issues not less than basic to a democratic
Justice Douglas, Chief Justice Warren, and Justice Black
dissented on the ground that the statute abridged freedom of
speech by limiting the union's participation in political activities." With regard to protecting minority rights, the dissent reasoned along the same lines as the concurrence in CIO, stating
that "[ilf minorities need protection against the use of union
funds for political speech-making, there are ways of reaching
that end without denying the majority their First Amendment
rights.
2. The source of union political funds: Pipefitters and Boyle

In contrast to CIO and UAW, which dealt with the nature
26. Justice Rutledge wrote the following:
If merely "minority or dissenter protection" were intended, it would be
sufficient for securing this to permit the dissenting members to carry the burden of making known their position and to relieve them of any duty to pay
dues or portions of them to be applied to the forbidden uses without jeopardy
to their rights as members. This would be clearly sufficient . . . to protect dissenting members against use of funds contributed by them for purposes they
disapprove, but would not deprive the union of the right to use the funds of
concurring members . . . without securing their express consent in advance of
the use.
Id.

27. 352 U.S.567 (1957).
28. Id. at 570. One of the questions the Court suggested might have a bearing on the
outcome of the trial was whether the UAW paid for the broadcast out of general union
funds or funds "fairly said to have been obtained on a voluntary basis." Id.
29. Id. at 594-98 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 597. The dissent criticized the limitation placed on majority rights as a
result of minority objections, equating the approach to "burning down the house to roast
the pig." Id. at 596. In a footnote, Justice Douglas proposed the English system as an
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of unlawful union political expenditures, Pipefitters Local 562 v.
United Statess1 dealt with the way in which the union collected
funds for admittedly lawful political expenditures. Officials of
Pipefitters Local 562 were convicted of conspiracy to violate section 610 for receiving union member payments that were funneled into a separate union fund and then disbursed to candidates. Union members had testified at trial that the
contributions were expected just as were dues and other fees."
The Supreme Court noted from the outset that based on its
legislative history "[section] 610 . . . does not prohibit a labor
organization from making, through the medium of a political
fund organized by it, contributions or expenditures in connection with federal elections, so long as the monies expended are
in some sense volunteered by those asked to c o n t r i b ~ t e . "The
~~
issue thus framed was whether the contributions were "knowing
free-choice donation^."'^ Once again the Court was concerned
about protecting the dissenting member.
The Court found that the union could control the fund,s5
but could only receive political contributions under circumstances plainly indicating to the individual member that (1) the
contribution was for political purposes, and (2) he might decline
without jeopardizing his union m e m b e r ~ h i p .The
~ ~ Court reversed the conviction and remanded with instructions to determine whether the political funds were voluntary donations or
alternative. In that system "[tlhe protection of minority union members from the use of
their funds in supporting a cause with which they do not sympathize may be cured by
permitting the minority to withdraw their funds from that activity." Id. a t 597 n.1.
31. 407 U.S. 385 (1972).
32. Id. at 393.
33. Id. at 401.
34. Id. a t 414.
35. Id. a t 439. Justice Powell dissented vigorously. He characterized the issue as
"whether the political fund of Local 562 was in reality a sham or subterfuge through
which the union itself made the contributions fobidden by the statute." Id. at 446-47.
Concerning the result reached by the majority he said the following:
By refusing to affirm the judgment below, the majority renders the ultimate fate of this litigation uncertain. If, on remand, the[se] techniques . . .
should be sanctioned, other unions and corporations could easily follow . . .
and obtain from members, employees, and shareholders a consent form attesting that the contribution (or withholding) is "voluntary." The trappings of voluntariness might be achieved while the substance of coercion remained. Union
members and corporate employees might find themselves the objects of regular
and systematized solicitation by the very agent which exercises direct control
over their jobs and livelihood.
Id. at 449.
36. Id. a t 414-15.
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"contributions effectively assessed."37
Shortly after Pipefitters, the issue of the "voluntariness" of
contributions was again raised in United States u. B ~ y l e . ~ ~
Boyle, a former president of the United Mine Workers (UMW),
was convicted of thirteen counts of unlawful campaign contributions under 18 U.S.C. § 610 and of unlawful conversion of union
funds and conspiracy. sdyle had authorized payments from
UMW general funds to the union's political arm, Labor's NonPartisan League, and from the League to candidates for federal
office. On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Boyle claimed that the government had neither
shown that the funds used were involuntary contributions, nor
that section 610 was unconstitutional-a question reserved in
pipe fitter^.^^

Rejecting the first claim, the circuit court found that the
"clear intent of 5 610 . . [was] to permit expenditures from
separate, segregated funds if the contributions to it were, in
truth, voluntary, and to prohibit expenditures from a union's
general treasury. . . . Congress intended to protect individual
union members against both overtly coerced and unknown con~ ~ the constitutional
tributions; each is equally i n v ~ l u n t a r y . "On
claim, the court found that the statute did not, as the defendant
contended, impinge on first amendment rights by limiting union
contributions to political campaigns. Rather, union political organizations might contribute "any amount'"' provided the monies were not raised through union dues and assessments. This
provision protected minority interests by requiring that the
funds be voluntary; section 610 was viewed as requiring a "contracting in" system where "assenting members [must] 'give affirmative evidence of such approval' by assenting to having a deduction made from the member's pay check."42 Therefore, the
majority could not compel the minority to subsidize majority political views. The Supreme Court denied review of the de~ision.'~
The Boyle view that section 610 adopted a system of "con-

.

37. Id. at 422.
38. 482 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973).
39. 407 U.S. at 400.
40. 482 F.2d at 761-62 (emphasis in original).
41. Id. at 763 (emphasis in original).
42. Id. at 764. In a "contracting in" system, a member must affirmatively assent to
any contribution. In a "contracting out" system, a member must assert his refusal to
make the contribution. Id. at 763-64.
43. Boyle v. United States, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973).
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tracting in" was clearly a new gloss on CIO, UAW, and Pipefitters. The Boyle court moved beyond the implicit holding of
UAW that political funds could not come from general union
dues, and even beyond the Pipefitters holding that political
funds must not be a condition for union membership; the Boyle
decision required that members give affirmative evidence of
their willing contribution-a requirement not found in either
UAW or Pipefitters and not explicit in the language of the
statute.44

B. Union Security and Section 152 (Eleventh)
One of the reasons Congress authorized the union shop was
to eliminate the "free-rider" problem. Unless unions could require fair contributions from all beneficiaries of the unions' collective-bargaining efforts, some members might not pay and
would thereby ride the financial coattails of the rest. The unionor agency-shop assessment is the fair cost to each employee of
the expense of collective bargaining-the value of which is presumably returned in the form of employee benefits and wages.
Section 152 (Eleventh) of the Railway Labor Act prescribes the
conditions under which a union may maintain a union shop and
a checkoff.45
One of the first cases to deal with union security under
.~~
secton 152 was Railway Employes' Department u. H ~ n s o nIn
Hanson a railroad employee claimed, among other things, that
the union-shop provision violated the first amendment right of
association. Justice Douglas found that Congress had the power
to enact a union-shop measure, and that the decision to do so
was "an allowable one."" While the Court ruled that the union
shop did not violate the right of association, the Court declined
44. "Section 610 wholly fails to specify what funds a labor organization is barred
from contributing or expending in connection with a federal election." Pipefitters Local
562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 401 n.12 (1972).
45. A union shop requires that the employee join the union either before or after
being hired. In an agency shop, nonunion employees must either join the union or pay a
service fee equivalent to membership fees, dues, and assessments. GUIDEBOOK
TO LABOR
REALTIONS
(CCH) 1 308 (1979).
"The context in which the difference between a union shop and an agency shop is of
'great importance' is in delimiting the union's power to discipline employees for breach
of the union's internal rules." Haggard, A Clarification of the Types of Union Security
Agreements Affirmatiuely Permitted by Federal Statutes, 5 RUT.-CAM.L.J. 418, 426
(1974).
46. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
47. Id. a t 233.
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to comment on potential violations of the right of e x p r e ~ s i o n . ~ ~
Five years after Hanson, the Supreme Court in Interna~
"questions of
tional Association of Machinists u. S t ~ e e t 'faced
the utmost gravity."'O In Street railroad employees protested
the compulsory nature of the union shop, claiming that union
monies, required as a condition of employment, were used to
finance campaigns of political candidates. After a lengthy review
of union security in the railway industry,'l the Court construed
the statute "to deny the unions, over an employee's objection,
the power to use his exacted funds to support political causes
which he opposes."52
The Court remanded the case to the Georgia courts to fashion the appropriate remedy. Some guidelines, however, were provided in the Court's opinion. First, the Court emphasized that
the courts should strive to "attain the appropriate reconciliation
between majority and dissenting interests in the area of political
expres~ion."'~Safeguards were found within the Act for the protection of both interests, and neither interest was to work to the
exclusion of the other? Second, in providing a remedy, the
court was not to presume that dissent existed?' Though monies
might still be exacted from employees not affirmatively indicating their dissent, the court and the union were to devise some
method to insure that the union did not use the dissenters'
48. The Court said the following:
If other conditions [other than 'periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments']
are in fact imposed, or if the exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assessments is
used as a cover for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention of the First Amendment, this judgment will not prejudice the decision in
that case.
Id. at 238.
49. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
50. Id. a t 749.
51. Id. a t 750-64. Even under the union-security provision, the Court noted that "a
union's status as exclusive bargaining representative carries with it the duty fairly and
equitably to represent all employees of the craft or class, union and nonunion." Id. a t
761 (citations omitted).
52. Id. a t 768-69. The question of whether a union could expend, over the objection
of an employee, funds for activities other than collective-bargaining agreements was not
decided. Id. Nor did any party contend that the expenditures violated Q 610. Id. a t 773
n.21.
53. Id. a t 773.
54. Id. a t 767-68.
55. Id. a t 774. The court will not hear claims of dissent by union members after they
have been discharged if they had an opportunity to dissent while employed. Hostetler v.
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 294 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.955
(1962).
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funds for the objectionable purposes.56
Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks v. Allens7
involved facts almost identical to those in Street. In Allen, however, the union demanded that a dissenting member indicate
each expenditure to which he objected. The Court held that no
dissenting employee may be required to specify .the objectionable expenditures. Rather, the dissenter merely had to inform the
union that he objected to any of the political expenditures,"
since to require more would place an impracticable burden on
the employee, particularly where only the union had a record of
the political expenditure^.'^
Allen is authority for two other significant points. For the
first time in a case involving the Railway Labor Act union security provision, the Court suggested that unions had a right to expend nondissenters' funds on political activities. Whereas in
Street the Court had spoken of balancing dissenter and union
interests, the Court in Allen described union political activity as
a right and not merely as a historical union function.60 In addition, the Court formulated a remedy and recommended that the
union refund the dissenting employees' share of the expended
funds as well as reduce all future exactions by the amount of the
political contribution^.^^
In interpreting the statutory provisions of the Railway Labor Act applicable in Hanson, Street, and Allen, the Court delineated certain rights and privileges as constitutionally permissible: (1) the union shop is a permissible means of maintaining
union security and does not prejudice any union member's right
of association, (2) political conformity, under the guise of union
security, may not be required over a union member's objection,
and (3) a dissenting member's objections, though not presumed,
need not be specified.
56. The Court suggested (1) an injunction against the expenditure of funds in proportion to the contribution of the dissenting employees to the political fund, of (2) a
rebate to the dissenters. 367 U.S. at 774-75.
57. 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
58. Id. at 118.
59. Id. at 122. The Court placed the burden on the party with easiest access to the
information.
60. The Court stated that "no decree would be proper which appeared likely to infringe the unions' right to expend uniform exactions under the union-shop agreement in
support of activities germane to collective bargaining and, as well, to expend nondissenters' such exactions in support of political activities." Id.
61. Id.

CASENOTES

C. Union Security and the Constitution
The Supreme Court largely resolved the section 610 and
section 152 cases without resorting to careful constitutional
analysis. Up to and including the Pipefitters decision in 1972,
the Supreme Court conscientiously avoided delineating the constitutional rights of individual union members with respect to
union political contributions. In fact the constitutionality of section 610-now section 441b-has never been challenged in the
Supreme Court,62and in Boyle the court of appeals only dealt
briefly with the issue? In both CIO and UAW, the Court refused to adjudicate the constitutional merits of the claims. In
both cases, a minority-four justices in CIO and three in
UAW-not only thought the Court should decide the constitutional issue but questioned the validity of the statute if protecting the minority members meant denying the union majority its
first amendment rights. The Hanson Court found that the
union-shop provision of section 152 did not violate the right of
association, but the Court did not decide whether it violated the
right of free speech. Allen suggested that the union shop did not
violate the right of association, and that the union itself might
even have a constitutional right to engage in political activity.
Against this panoply of constitutional intimations, the Supreme Court decided Abood v. Detroit Board of Education" and
thrust itself into the fray between individual and collective
rights. After its certification as bargaining agent in 1967, the Detroit Federation of Teachers secured a collective-bargaining
~~
agreement that included an agency-shop p r o v i s i ~ n .Abood,
along with other teachers in the Detroit school system, complained that the union had used service fees and dues for activities unrelated to collective bargaining? The teachers sought to
have the agency-shop provision declared invalid under Michigan
law and unconstitutional as a violation of the right of
as~ociation.~~
62. Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 400 (1972); United States v.
UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 592 (1957); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 124 (1948).
63. Cf. United States v. Chestnut, 394 F. Supp. 581,588, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ($ 610
was neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad).
64. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
65. The provision required that nonunion teachers, within 60 days of hire, join the
union or pay a service fee equal to the union dues. Id. at 212.
66. The service fee was a condition of employment and those refusing to pay it were
subject to discharge. Id. at 212.
67. Id. at 213.
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Relying on Hanson, the Michigan Court of Appeals had upheld the validity of the agency-shop clause. The court, however,
had also held that the union could not make expenditures unrelated to collective bargaining over an employee's objections;
moreover, the employee had to "make known to the union those
causes and candidates to which he objects."68 The United States
Supreme Court noted probable jurisdi~tion.~~
In argument before the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs tried
to distinguish Hanson on the grounds that it only involved private sector employees, whereas in Abood the teachers were government employees. The plaintiffs argued, therefore, that they
were entitled to greater constitutional guarantees.?O Plaintiffs
also contended that collective bargaining in the public sector
was itself such a politically entangled process that to require
union membership was to require "ideological ~onformity."~'
The Court rejected both arguments. First, the Hanson rationale
applied "not because there was no governmental action, but be~~
the
cause there was no First Amendment ~ i o l a t i o n . "Second,
Court found that a public sector agency shop was constitutionally permissible and, therefore, a legislative determinati~n.?~
In holding that the agency shop was permissible, the Court
reaffirmed that the union could finance noncollective-bargaining
activities from the contributions of members: "We do not hold
that a union cannot constitutionally spend funds for the expression of political views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward the advancement of other ideological causes not germane
to its duties as collective-bargaining repre~entative."~'Although
the union can support its causes through the contributions of
some members, the Court held that the union could not compel
support for noncollective-bargaining causes from all members:
68. 60 Mich. App. 92, 102, 230 N.W.2d 322, 327 (1975).
69. 425 U.S. 949 (1976).
70. 431 U.S. a t 226, 227 & n.23.
71. Id. a t 226.
72. Id. In fact, in Hanson, the enactment of the federal statute was the government
action. Id. a t 218 n.12.
73. The Court reasoned as follows:
[Michigan] has determined that labor stability will be served by a system of
exclusive representation and the permissive use of an agency shop in public
employment. . . . [Tlhere can be no principled basis for according that decision less weight in the constitutional balance than was given in Hanson to the
congressional judgment reflected in the Railway Labor Act.
Id. a t 229.
74. Id. a t 235.
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"[Tlhe Constitution requires . . . that such expenditures be
financed from charges, dues, or assessments paid by employees
who do not object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing so against their will by the threat of loss of govConsistent with Allen, the Court furernmental empl~yrnent."~~
ther held that objecting employees need not specify their
objections. On this point the Court reversed and remanded the
case to the Michigan courts.78
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment77 but criticized
the majority, contending they had not required the state to
prove overriding state interests as a defense to a first amendment claim.78 He reasoned that since a dissenting union member's views are p r ~ t e c t e d to
a union to exact fees puts
, ~ permit
~
the burden of litigaton on the dissenter. Proper placement of the
burden would "require the State [employer] to come forward
and demonstrate, as to each union expenditure for which it
would exact support from minority employees, that the compelled contribution is necessary to serve overriding governmental obje~tives."~~
This burden would protect the minority's views
but would not impede the overriding interests of the state.
In large measure, Abood adopted as a constitutional standard the statutory standard enunciated in Hanson, Street, and
Allen: union-security clauses are permissible under the Constitution provided that no objecting employee is compelled to contribute to causes unrelated to collective bargaining. By acknowledging that union-security provisions are permissible, the Court
did not raise the provisions to the status of a union right,8l thus
leaving open the question of the effect of section 610 on a union
or agency shop founded on section 152 or Abood. Since that
75. Id. a t 235-36.
76. Id. a t 241-42.
77. Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. Justices Stevens and Rehnquist wrote brief concurring opinions.
78. Id. a t 262 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 US. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
79. See Madison School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429
U.S. 167 (1976) (commission could not prohibit nonunion teacher from speaking a t public school board meeting on pending collective bargaining negotiations).
80. 431 U.S. a t 264. See also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,
526-27 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
81. The National Labor Relations Act $ 14(b), 29 U.S.C. $ 164(b) (1976), allows the
states to prohibit union shops. For a discussion of the interaction of NLRA $ 14(b) and 9
152 of the Railway Labor Act, see Comment, The Regulation of Union Political Activity:
Majority and Minority Rights and Remedies, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 386, 416-20 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Majority and Minority Rights].
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which is constitutionally permissible is not necessarily constitutionally mandated, it is the interaction of section 610, section
152, and Abood that must be reconciled in section 441b
decisions.

In the instant case, the district court found that the NEA's
reverse checkoff procedure violated section 441b(b) (3)(A) of the
Federal Election Campaign Act. The Act states that it shall be
unlawful for a union "to make a contribution or expenditure by
utilizing . . . dues, fees, or other moneys required as a condition
of membership in a labor organization or as a condition of emp l ~ y r n e n t . "The
~ ~ court enjoined the further use of the reverse
political checkoff as per se illegalBs"because it . . . requires the
dissenter to act to prevent a contribution rather than requiring
his affirmative assent to make
The court, relying heavily on Pipefitters Local 562 v.
United States and United States v. Boyle, decided that a
" 'knowing free-choice' " contribution could only be made under
" 'circumstances plainly indicating donations are for political
purposes.'
The reverse checkoff did not comply with this condition, nor according to B ~ y l e , ~would
'
a refund of the contribution adequately protect dissenters' rights. The court further justified its finding that the political checkoff was an involuntary
contribution by the fact that the NEA had a ninety-one percent
contribution rate. This raised an inference that the members
contributed in ign~rance.'~Consequently, the burden of ascer82. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(3)(A) (1976).
83. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Educ. Ass'n, 457 F. Supp. 1102, 1110
(D.D.C. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-1077 (D.c. Cir. Jan. 22, 1979).
84. Id. a t 1106. Local affiliates of the NEA do not have to adopt the checkoff and
may allow dues to be paid by check or in cash. Members paying in cash or by check do
not have to make the contribution. Id. a t 1104.
FEC regulations now prohibit the political use of "fees or monies paid as a condition
of acquiring or retaining membership or employment . . . even though . . . refundable
upon request of the payor." 11 C.F.R. 114.5(a)(l) (1977).
85. 457 F. Supp. a t 1105 (quoting Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S.
385, 414 (1972)).
86. The Boyle court rejected "contracting in" and "contracting out" as a less restrictive alternative.
87. Apparently no member was forced to submit to the checkoff, and of those members who did submit during the three years in question, approximately 65,000 (only 8.5%
of all contributors) received refunds. 457 F. Supp. a t 1108.
The court also referred t o statistics compiled by the Kentucky NEA, which showed
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taining that the union received only voluntary political contributions "must be on the solicitor and not on the dissenter?"'
The NEA relied upon both Abood and Street in support of
its checkoff, but the court distinguished Abood and ignored
Street.80 Because Abood did not affect the statutory regulation
of elections, the court's inquiry was unaffected by Abood. Furthermore, in Abood the union had not maintained a separate
union fund for political, social, or other noncollective-bargaining
expenses, whereas in both Pipefitters and the instant case, the
union had kept a political fund distinct from the collective-bargaining assessment.^ The Supreme Court in Abood balanced the
minority members' interests against the union's interests and
supported the union; in the instant case, the court found no
"comparable justification" for b a l a n ~ i n g . ~ ~
To remedy the improper deductions by the NEA, the court
ordered the National Education Association to refund the contributions to all nonassenting members "at no expense to them
and with minimal effort on their part."02 The court suggested
that the NEA provide through its magazine a postage-prepaid
card informing members that if they did not return the cards to
the NEA, their contributions would be refunded.03 Finally, the
that in any three-month period in the year prior to November 1975, the Kentucky NEA
never collected more than $5,740; after the reverse checkoff was instituted, the contributions ranged between $18,912 and $82,081. "Such a dramatic change suggests inadequate
information to the members that the additional amount for political contributions was
voluntary." Id. It should be noted that the pre-checkoff period was an off-election year,
while the year following the implementation of the checkoff was both a congressional and
presidential election year.
The NEA alleged that each member was informed of the voluntary nature of the
contribution, that the contribution was not a condition of membership, and that each
member was told how to request a refund. Brief for Appellant at 12, Federal Election
Comm'n v. National Educ. Ass'n, 457 F. Supp. 1102 (D.D.C. 1978), appeal docketed, No.
79-1077 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 22, 1979).
88. 457 F. Supp. at 1109.
89. Id. at 1107 & n.lO.
90. The court tried to distinguish Abood on the grounds that the union there funded
the objectionable activities out of its general fund. Since in both Pipefitters and the
instant case, the union had a separate, segregated fund, the court found Pipefitters to
apply. The court did not attempt to explain why Boyle would then apply to the instant
case, since in Boyle the union had a "separate" fund but contributed general union funds
to the political fund. United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1076 (1973).
91. 457 F. Supp. at 1107.
92. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Educ. Ass'n, [I9781 771 GOV'TEMPL.REL.
REP. (BNA) 46, 51 (D.D.C. 1978).
93. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Educ. Ass'n, 99 L.R.R.M. 3463, 3463
(D.D.C. 1978).
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NEA was enjoined from using the reverse checkoff to fund its
political a~tivities?~

The enjoining of a reverse political fund checkoff by which a
union is engaged in neither criminal misconduct nor overt coercion is unprecedented. The repercussions of the NEA decision
will affect labor's ability to fund its political activities, and because of the inherently political nature of public sector collective
bargaining, public sector labor unions will be particularly affected. In analyzing the NEA case, this Note will discuss three
main areas. First, this Note will examine the statutory interpretation that should be given section 441b in light of section 610
and section 152. Second, it will analyze some of the constitutional implications arising from the trade-off between traditional
union political activities and the rights of union members. Finally, this Note will consider NEA in terms of union security
and public sector labor policy.

A. Statutory Standards for Section 441b
Section 441b contains two subsections of importance to the
instant case: 441b(a) and 441b(b)(3)(A).Subsection 441(a) prohibits union and corporate expenditures in connection with any
federal election. With the exception of one additional phrase
and an additional word, section 441b(a) is identical to section
610. Subsection 441b(b)(3)(A) prohibits establishing a separate,
segregated union political fund using "dues, fees, or other moneys required as a condition of membership in a labor organiza~ ~ language, though
tion or as a condition of e m p l ~ y m e n t . "This
not identical, is strikingly similar to section 152 (Eleventh) (b)?
The language of section 441b affirms the Court's assertion
in Pipefitters that the Federal Election Campaign Act merely
codified prior law." The first inquiry in analyzing the NEA decision is whether section 441b, interpreted in light of section 610,
actually prohibits unions from using a reverse checkoff to fund
political activities; the second inquiry is whether section 152
94. 457 F. Supp. at 1112.
95. 2 U.S.C. 441b(b)(3)(A) (1976).
96. 45 U.S.C. $ 152 (Eleventh) (1976).
97. 407 U.S. at 399. The two Pipefitters requirements were codified at 2 U.S.C. $
441b(b)(WB), (C).

,
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(Eleventh) affects the interpretation of section 441b.

1. Relationship of 610 to 441 b: "Knowing free-choice"
Pipefitters set the section 610 standard for unions raising
political funds: (1) the member must receive notice of the political nature of his contribution, and (2) the member may decline
to contribute without jeopardizing his union membership." The
NEA case requires a "knowing free-choice." Of course, union
members who must affirmatively assert their willingness to contribute make a knowing free-choice, but that is not the issue in
this case. The real question is whether union members subject to
a checkoff can also make a knowing free-choice. The district
court was not free to re-create federal labor policy.
Although Pipefitters effectively requires notice to employees concerning the nature of the fund, neither section 152 (Eleventh) nor the Street opinion explicitly mentions giving such notice to the employee in the reverse checkoff situation. Such a
right may nevertheless be inferred from the fact that prohibiting
the union from using an employee's dues for .political purposes
over his objection would be a hollow right if the employee was
never apprised of how his money was being used?
It is not clear whether the NEA's reverse checkoff meets the
second Pipefitters criterion, that a member may decline to contribute without jeopardizing his union membership. On this particular point the facts of Pipefitters and Boyle provide no direction because neither case involved a fact situation similar to that
of the instant case. In Pipefitters, union members contributed to
the political fund "in the same sense that they paid their dues or
other financial obligations,"loOand the union made no attempt
to dissuade union members from thinking the contributions
were compulsory.101 In Boyle, the UMW, through subterfuge,
funded candidates directly out of general union funds-funds
required as a condition of membership.lo2
Nevertheless, in one sense the Abood holding satisfies Pipefitters because the union member may obtain a refund of his
contribution without specifying his objections, much less losing
98. 407 U.S. at 414-15.
99. Section 152 (Eleventh) (b) requires a written assignment that is revocable after
one year or after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement.
100. 407 U.S. at 393.
101. Id. at 395.
102. 482 F.2d at 761.

420

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I980

his union membership or his job.lo3 In the NEA situation, for
example, once the union membership accepted the checkoff, individual members who did not wish to contribute had the burden of requesting the refund. Even though the political contribution was exacted, a member retained sufficient control over
the donation to obtain a refund. In a case similar to the instant
case but involving a state statute, a federal district court stated:
"Inertia of a person to take a step to see to it that his money is
not being used for political purposes does not deprive him of the
right to take that step and cannot be logically interpreted . . .
as coercion."lo4 Neither Pipefitters nor Boyle mentioned the
possibility of union members obtaining a refund; therefore,
neither provides a standard for determining what is a "knowing
free-choice" in a reverse checkoff. In fact, individuals could not
even bring an action under section 610, meaning that individuals
filing a civil action for a refund would have brought it under
either the Railway Labor Act cases or Abood.lo6The NEA case,
if decided under either the Street or Abood rationale, would undoubtedly have been decided in favor of the National Education
Association.lo6
2. Relationship of 152 (Eleventh) to 441b: in pari rnateria

The court in the instant case held that Street and Allen
103. 431 U.S. at 235-36, 241.
104. Kentucky Educators Pub. Affairs Council v. Kentucky Registry of Election
Ky. Jan. 25, 1978). The Kentucky EducaFin., No. C 77-0575 L(A), slip op. at 8 (W.D.
tion Association approved a reverse checkoff for dues and political contributions. However, the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance found that the checkoff violated KY.
REV.STAT.§ 121.320(2) (1970). The Kentucky statute is similar to 441b. The court
found that the checkoff was not coercive but determined that it might be an "assessment" under the statute. No. C 77-0575 L(A), slip op. at 8. The NEA court noted the
Kentucky case but dismissed it stating that the unresolved issue of whether the checkoff
was an "assessment" was "most closely analogous to the one at bar." 457 F. Supp. a t
1107 n.11.
105. Section 610 was a criminal statute and did not create a civil action. Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66 (1975) (shareholder derivative action against a corporation for political expenditures); McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157 (7th Cir. 1975) (union members
sought damages for dues used for political purposes); Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
394 F. Supp. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd mem., 530 F.2d 964 (3rd Cir. 1976) (stockholder
derivative suit). Section 441 is also a criminal statute with penalties similar to those of $
610. 2 U.S.C. $ 441j (1976). There is no evidence in § 441 of congressional intent to
create a civil remedy.
106. The court ordered a refund to all members not specifically and affirmatively
assenting to the contribution; however, 441 provides no authorization for such relief. In
fact, the prescribed remedy does not follow from any of the 610 cases-CIO, UAW,
Pipefitters, or Boyle-but only from the suggestions by the concurrence in CIO and the
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were inapposite because they dealt with the union-shop provisions of the Railway Labor Act and not the Federal Election
Campaign Act. Such a light dismissal of Street and Allen is unfortunate.lo7 Since cases may arise under both section 441b of
title 2 and section 152 of title 45, and since the statutes contain
almost the same phrase, under the doctrine of in pari materia,
the similar phrases should be given similar interpretations.lo8
If, as NEA holds, section 441b prohibits raising funds
through a reverse checkoff, the political funds must first be categorized as dues, fees, or effective dues or assessments, and then
be found to be required as a condition of employment. Pipefitters gives little guidance to the instant case on what was meant
by "dues, fees or assessment,"10s but Street's recital of the hisdissent in UAW. These suggestions clearly accord with the refund remedies in Street,
Allen, and Abood.
The NEA court presumed dissent on the part of the NEA's members and ordered
class relief, even though no class had been certified. Part of the court's order in NEA was
that
defendants [NEA], in consultation with plaintiff [FEC], prepare a plan pursuant to which their members will be informed of this lawsuit and the decision of
this Court and will be afforded the opportunity of having refunded a t no expense to them and with minimal effort on their part the money that has been
deducted from their paychecks through reverse check-off.
Federal Election Comm'n v. National Educ. Ass'n, [I9781 771 GOV'T EMPL. REL.
REP.(BNA) 51 (D.D.C. 1978).
The $ 610 cases contribute nothing on this point, but the Railway Labor Act cases
held that "dissent is not to be presumed," International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street,
367 U.S. 740,774 (1961), which means that the court will not grant class action relief. No
relief will be given without proof that an individual member objects. Brotherhood of Ry.
& S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 119 (1963). Accord, Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209, 237-39 (1977).
107. Since the language in $ 441b(b)(3)(A) was not a part of $ 610 but is similar to
language in $ 152, the Railway Labor Act cases should be persuasive. See Politics and
Pipefitters, supra note 20, at 955-56 (Street had a substantial impact on $ 610). See also
Majority and Minority Rights, supra note 81, at 424 (Street remedy protects dissenters
and meets purposes of Federal Election Campaign Act, therefore should be applied to
National Labor Relations Act cases).
108. See, e.g., Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535, 546, 551-52 (1954)
(Congress presumed to have accepted interpretation of the previous statute in passing a
new statute with similar language); Marks v. United States, 161 U.S. 297, 302 (1896)
(frequent use of the same phrase in the same subject matter suggests a single meaning).
See generally 2A C. SANDS,
STATUTES
AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
$$ 51.01-.03 (1973).
109. 407 U.S. a t 421-27. In Pipefitters, the Court interpreted the phrase to include
"not only actual but also effective dues or assessments." Id. a t 427. The Court further
stated that "the political contributions in issue violated $ 610 if, and only if, payments to
the fund were actually or effectively required for employment or union membership.
.
[Tlhe essence of the crime in this respect is whether the method of solicitation for the
fund was calculated to result in knowing free-choice donations." Id. a t 439. On this point
the Court found that the allegation that general union funds were given t o the political

..
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tory of section 152 states that " 'fees' meant 'initiation fees,' and
'assessments' was intended primarily to cover the situation of a
union which had only nominal dues."llo The refundable political
contribution does not fit under any of these statutory terms.lll
This conclusion is bolstered by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute in Street and Allen. Because the Court ordered a refund, even though section 152 permitted a checkoff,
one must conclude that either the Court ignored the statute in
providing the remedy or, more plausibly, refundable political
contributions do not qualify as the type of dues, fees, or assessments required as a condition of employment.l12
Even if political contributions could be classified as dues,
fees, or assessments, they can hardly be considered a "condition
fund supported an inference that the political "contributions" were not "knowing freechoice donations." Id. a t 415-16 n.28, 439 n.48.
The NEA funds clearly did not come from general union funds; nevertheless, the
NEA court interpreted Pipefitters' "free-choice donations" to mean "an act intentionally
taken and not the result of inaction when confronted with an obstacle." 457 F. Supp. a t
1109. The facts and statements in Pipefitters simply do not go as far as the NEA holding, although the two decisions are not incompatible.
110. 367 U.S. a t 766.
111. In an early case dealing with § 152, the Texas Supreme Court stated, "We
think a political assessment was not contemplated by the Congress in using the term
'assessments' in the union shop statute, nor that the failure to pay a political assessment
would be a valid ground for discharge." Sandsberry v. International Ass'n of Machinists,
156 Tex. 340, 346, 295 S.W.2d 412, 416 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 918 (1957).
In NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 US. 734 (1963), the Supreme Court found
that under the National Labor Relations Act 5 8(a)(3) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)
(1976)), where employment is conditioned upon union membership,
membership . . . may . . . be conditioned only upon payment of fees and dues.
"Membership" as a condition of employment is whittled down to its financial
core.
. . . If an employee in a union shop unit refuses to respect any unionimposed obligations other than the duty to pay dues and fees, and membership
in the union is therefore denied or terminated, the condition of "membership"
for 5 8(a)(3) purposes is nevertheless satisfied and the employee may not be
discharged for nonmembership.
U.S. a t 742-43.
112. The Street Court wrote the following:
The appellees [dissenters] . . . remain obliged, as a condition of continued emloyment, to make the payments to their respective unions called for by the
agreement. Their right of action stems not from constitutional limitations on
Congress' power to authorize the union shop, but from 8 2 [§ 1521, Eleventh
itself. In other words, appellees' grievance stems from the spending of their
funds for purposes not authorized by the Act in the face of their objection, not
from the enforcement of the union-shop agreement by the mere collection of
their funds. If their money were used for purposes contemplated by § 2 [§ 1521,
Eleventh, the appellees would have no grievance at all.
U.S. at 771.
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of employment."113Continued employment is not founded upon
payment to a political fund. The test for the "condition of membership" clause should be whether failure to make the contribution is a ground for dismissal from the union; since Street, political contributions have not been in this category.
Adherence to the doctrine of in pari materia would promote
a consistent standard for labor unions. It is conceivable that dissenting union members could bring an action against a labor
union under section 152 (Eleventh) and the Constitution to enjoin the reverse checkoff. On the basis of Street and Abood, the
court would deny the injunction.l14 Based on NEA, the same
court would grant an injunction to the Federal Election Commission on an identical claim phrased in language identical to
that of section 441b. NEA is clearly, but unnecessarily, a t odds
with Street and Abood. Consistent interpretation of section 441b
and section 152 would avoid such an anomalous result.

B. Constitutional Questions Affecting Union Security
Concluding that the political checkoff is or is not statutorily
permissible does not dispose of the substantial first amendment
problems. The Supreme Court has formed a two-edged constitutional sword that cuts against the positions of both the Federal
Election Commisson and the National Education Association.
In Railway Employes' Department v. Hanson, the Court
decided that the union-shop provision, which compels association for certain activities related to collective bargaining, did not
the parameters of
violate freedom of as~ociaton.~~Westricting
the Hanson decision, the Court in Street and Abood prohibited
the funding of activities outside the scope of collective bargaining to the extent of an objecting employee's contribution.l16 Dis113. See NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. at 742-43. In Barber v. Gibbons,
367 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mo. 1973), the union required a contribution from each member,
but the member could authorize the union to place the contribution in the political fund

instead of the general union fund. The court found the contribution was a condition of
membership in violation of $ 610.
114. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. at 237-41; International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. at 771-72. The Court stated in Street, "We also think that a
blanket injunction against all expenditures of funds for the disputed purposes, even one
conditioned on cessation of improper expenditures, would not be a proper exercise of
equitable discretion." Id. at 772.
115. 351 U.S. at 238.
116. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. at 237; International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. at 768-70.
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senters may be excused from participating in union political activities by merely manifesting their objection to the union's
expenditures.'17 Thus the Court fashioned. a presumption in
favor of union political affiliation118 that the dissenter has the
power to overcome.11s
The trend following Street and Abood has been to create a
right not to associate.laOFor example, the result in the instant
case would be consistent with such a theory.121 In light of the
established right of association, the recognition of a right of
nonassociation would ensure that the government could not prohibit association or nonassociation except upon a showing of a
compelling state interest.la2
The argument for a right not to associate, however, would
effectively stand Street and Abood on their heads, since the presumption granted unions in those cases would be reversed. In
Street and Abood, the Court permitted a presumption favoring
majority political activity that the dissenting member must
overcome, whereas in NEA, the court created a presumption
favoring the would-be dissenter that the majority must overcome. In either case, one party or the other must make an af117. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 118 (1963).
118. In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), the Court said, "[Tlhere is no longer
any doubt that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect certain forms of orderly
group activity. Thus we have affirmed the right 'to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas.' " Id. a t 430 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)).
119. The burden of proof is on the union to show that dues are spent for permissible
purposes, but the employee has a duty to continue to pay dues pending that determintion. Browne v. Milwaukee Bd. of School Directors, 83 Wis. 2d 316, 340-340b, 265 N.W.
2d 559, 570-71 (1978).
120. See, e.g., Jensen v. Farrell Line, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Good v.
Associated Students of Univ. of Wash., 86 Wash. 2d 94, 101-02, 542 P.2d 762,766 (1975).
See also Note, 14 WAKEFORESTL. REV.633, 646 (1978).
121. This philosophy is evident in the district court's subsequent order to the NEA.
The NEA proposed an insert for an issue of its magazine, Today's Education, which is
sent to each NEA member. Any members desiring refunds of their contributions made
during the previous three years would mail a postage-prepaid card. Both the FEC and
the National Right to Work Committee protested that this proposal would only perpetuate the reverse checkoff. The court agreed and ordered the NEA to provide a postageprepaid card that members who did not want to refund could return. Any members not
mailing the card would automatically receive a refund of $1.00 for each year they contributed. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Educ. Ass'n, 99 L.R.R.M. 3463 (D.D.C.
1978).
122. Compare NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430, 438 (1963) (only compelling
state interest can limit right to associate for political purposes), with Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 264 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring) (overriding governmental
interest required to compel minority political association).
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firmative showing. The individual's burden of assenting to, or
dissenting from, a contribution does not seem significantly
heavier in either case. In light of the more established right of
association and the voluntary nature of the National Education
Association, the presumption in favor of the union presents the
more reasonable approach. Nonetheless, the NEA result remains
inconsistent with the Street and Abood Supreme Court
decisions.las
The Court recently recognized that corporations possess a
first amendment right of speech;lu unions will likely claim the
same right? If indeed unions possess that right, the decision in
the instant case makes the NEA's rights of association and free
speech of negligible import unless the membership can take collective action even though an individual member dissents. Democratic tradition seeks to protect the minority while giving efficacy to majority decisions. The Court's acknowledgement that
contributions serve to affiliate the individual contributor with
123. See also United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948). "Unions too most often
operate under the electoral process and the principle of majority rule. Nor . . . does it
seem reasonable to presume dissent from mere absence of explicit assent, especially in
view of long-established union practice." Id. at 149 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
124. "We thus find no support in the First or Fourteenth Amendment, or in the
decisions of this Court, for the proposition that speech that otherwise would be within
the protection of the First Amendment loses that protection simply because its source is
a corporation . . . ." First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978). Nevertheless,
this first amendment right may be very limited as indicated by the Bellotti Court's suggestion that the government interest in preventing corruption of the political process
might sustain 5 441b against a a t amendment challenge. Id. at 787 n.26. The dissent in
Bellotti stated that the Court had only "reserve[d] the formal interment of the Corrupt
Practices Act [§ 441bI and similar state statutes for another day." Id. at 821 (White, J.,
dissenting).
125. See id. at 777. See also Politics and Pipefitters, supra note 20, at 980-82.
Affording unions first amendment rights creates an additional dilemma in the NEA,
or even Abood, situation: What or who constitutes the union? If it is the entire membership, then the NEA decision may burden the political decision-making process and chill
the union's first amendment rights. On the other hand, if it is only the majority, then the
practice of exclusive representation should be abandoned and minority unions be allowed. See Note, The Privilege of Exclusive Recognition and Minority Union Rights in
L. REV. 1004, 1010-11, 1025 (1970).
Public Employment, 55 CORNELL
The NEA and other unions might argue that since political speech is protected,
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US. 254
(1964), a union's political speech should be given greater protection than its collectivebargaining activities. Comment, The Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on Corporate
and Union Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 148, 154
(1974).
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the cause or candidatelB6was complemented by the decision in
Street to give individuals the power to disafltliate themselves by
requesting a refund. The instant case gives complete effect to
the minority's viewpoint at the expense of the majority's rights
of association and speech.127 On the other hand, allowing the
checkoff in the tradition of Street, Allen, and Abood would give
effect to majority decisions to fund political activities while protecting the minority's right to refuse financial or moral support
for the union's political stance.
The constitutional questions raised here lend themselves
well to a balancing approach. Since in Abood the Court found
that the agency shop did not infringe on the minority's first
amendment rights, the prohibition of a reverse political checkoff
runs the risk of offending the majority's right of association. The
Court has consistently suggested the refund mechanism as a
means of protecting the minority while not significantly burdening majority decisions.lm Because no one is compelled to join the
NEA and because a member may withdraw from the Association
at any time, adopting the Street and Abood refund would strike
a particularly appropriate balance in the instant case.12@To
eliminate the reverse checkoff would swing the constitutional
pendulum away from the right of association toward a right of
nonassociation where a single dissenter can veto the timehonored principle of majority rule.
126. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976). See Cullen v. New York State Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 435 F. Supp. 546, 551 (E.D.N.Y 1977). But cf. Wright, Politics and the
Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALEL.J. 1001, 1005 (1976) (nothing commits us to
the dogma that money is speech).
127. Comment, The Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on Corporate and Union
Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 42 U. CHI.L. REV.148, 154 (1974).
128. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 240 & n.41 (1977); Brotherhood of
Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 122 (1963); International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Street, 367 U.S. 740,774-75 (1961); United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 597 n.1 (1957)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 149 (1948) (Rutledge, J.,
concurring).
129. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 n.34 (1978), where Justice
Powell suggested that a critical factor in determining minority first amendment rights is
the voluntary or involuntary nature of the association. His opinion can be read to suggest
that in a voluntary union, the minority might not even have a refund remedy against the
union; instead, the minority's only remedy might be to withdraw. Justice White disagreed that dissenting members or stockholders should have to withdraw and cited to
Street and Abood as demonstrating the way the Court has protected minority interests.
Id. a t 813-14 (White, J., dissenting). Thus, according to the dicta in Bellotti, dissenters
in voluntary unions either have no remedy (Justice Powell) or must resort to the Street
refund (Justice White).
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C. Federal Labor Policy Considerations
1. Purposes of the agency shop: collective bargaining and the

"free-rider

"

The political activities of private sector unions generally
have a less direct impact on bargaining activities than do those
of public sector unions. In the public sector, the very nature of
the employer makes public sector labor relations a political proc e s ~ Not
. ~ ~only
~ does a checkoff provision preserve union
financial security and bargaining,lJ1 but where the public union
bargains with and lobbies to the same party, the line between
collective bargaining for present agreements and politicking for
future agreements becomes hazy.lJ2 While the NEA principle
will burden union activities in both the public and the private
sector, the greatest incidence of the burden will be felt in the
public sector.1JgIn contrast to NEA, the Street and Abood decisions would give greater effect to legislation seeking parity for
labor in collective bargaining.
While the FEC's and the district court's concern for the
rights of dissenting union members can be appreciated, the N E A
decision straps the NEA with a free-rider problem affecting the
lobbying activities of the union. By enjoining the use of reverse
130. "'The uniqueness of public employment is not in the employees nor in the
work performed; the uniqueness is in the special character of the employer.' " Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. at 230 (quoting Summers, Public Sector Bargaining:
Problems of Governmental Decisionmaking, 44 U. CIN.L. REV.669,670 (1975)) (emphasis in original).
131. See Note, The Privilege of Exclusive Recognition and Minority Union Rights
L. REV. 1004, 1010 (1970). See also D. SULLIVAN,
in Public Employment, 55 CORNELL
PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT
LABOR
LAWg 16.6 (1969); Nolan, Public Sector Collective BargainL. REV.419, 456-57 (1978) (union security
ing: Defining the Federal Role, 63 CORNELL
and disciplinary measures contravene the merit principle).
132. Cf. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 236 (1977) (difficult to draw
lines in the public sector between activities related and unrelated to collective bargaining); Havas v. Communications Workers of America, 454 F. Supp. 305,308 n.5 (N.D.N.Y.
1978) (categorizing union activities as collective bargaining is a matter of degree); Jensen
v. Yonamine, 437 F. Supp. 368, 376 (D. Hawaii 1977) (difficult to distinguish between
collective-bargaining activities and political activities).
133. One commentator has written the following:
If the first amendment is construed to prohibit public employee unions from
expending, over an employee's objection, money collected under union security
agreements to finance lobbying and other similar activities aimed a t promoting
decisions on such "political" matters favorable to their bargaining demands,
the unions' ability to achieve their demands when collective bargaining actually occurs would be severely limited.
Blair, Union Security Agreements in Public Employment, 60 CORNELL
L. REV.183, 195
(1975).
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checkoff and by requiring affirmative proof of the intent to donate, any NEA member may do nothing and receive all the benefits of the NEA's political activities, which will undoubtedly
sufFer.lS4 Although a union's free-rider problem would not be
completely eliminated so long as a member could object and get
a rebate, not presuming dissent would at least keep the burden
on the employee. Under the Street rule, the cost to an employee
of being a free-rider is the time and effort required to dissent;ls5
under NEA, there is no cost or burden to being a free-rider. The
NEA requirement may actually place a greater burden on the
employee who wishes to contribute, since the employee must affirmatively assert himself in favor of each expenditure in order
to donate to the political fund;lS6under Allen, objections to political expenditures of any kind need only be made once.
In the NEA context, where NEA membership is voluntary,
teachers considering joining the NEA will weigh the costs of
membership against the perceived benefits. One cost will be the
cost of the union's political activities that the NEA member will
bear regardless of whether he makes a de minimus financial contribution. If the costs, ideological or financial, are greater than
the benefits of membership, the teacher will not join; therefore,
political affiliation becomes part of the cost of membership.lS7
2. Alternatives to rebate

The Supreme Court has placed great emphasis on allowing
134. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Educ. Ass'n, 457 F. Supp. 1102,110720 (D.D.C. 1978),appeal docketed, No. 79-1077 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 22,1979); Comment, The
Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on Corporate and Union Campaign Contributions
and Expenditures, 42 U. CHI.L. REV.148,159 n.62 (1974). But see Majority and Minority Rights, supra note 81, at 409 (size of voluntary political funds suggests that members
do support their union's political endeavors).
In a case analogous to the instant case, it was suggested that rather than offer a
rebate to dissenters, it might actually be more economical and less troublesome to strike
the procedure and request voluntary contributions. Anderson v. City of Boston, 78 Mass.
Adv. Sh. 2297, 2320 n.20, 380 N.E. 2d 628, 640 n.20 (1978), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S.
lOs0 (1979).
135. It might be argued, however, that the payroll deduction deprives dissenting
employees of the interest on contributions they will ultimately have refunded. While the
interest on the $1.00 NEA deduction would be de minimus to any individual, in the
aggregate the union clearly benefits. The court in the instant case did not order the NEA
to refund the contributions with interest.
136. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV.L. REV.70, 198 (1977).
137. This argument is not as viable in an agency- or union-shop case, such as Abood,
but is peculiar to a voluntary labor organization such as the NEA or, perhaps, a corporation. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 n.34 (1978).
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the unions to seek an internal remedy,lS8including a rebate. A
rebate, however, is not the only remedy. The rebate procedure
has a certain "one person, one vote" flair to it, but is is hardly
consistent with democratic sportsmanship for players to be able
to withdraw from the game after losing the toss. Ideally, dissenters would work within the union to gain a representative vote.
Challenging the politics of the leaders and voicing objections to
the use of political funds might be more effective when done
within the union than if carried on by the innocuous protest of a
rebate?@ Some unions have allowed dissenters to contract out of
political activities.140Finally, one commentator suggests that in
an agency-shop situation, nonunion members paying fees should
be presumed to object to the political contribution, while those
who are union members should be presumed to approve of the
deduction. The fee payers may aftirmatively assent to a donation, and the union members may affirmatively dissent from the
deduction.141

IV. CONCLUSION
Federal Election Commission v. National Education Association is a vexing case in which there are many competing interests at stake-individual and collective, statutory and constitutional, and economic and political. The district court opinion
shows a concern for the individual union members that no other
court has shown when weighing individual rights against union
interests and rights. Although the court followed the unclear
standards of Pipefitters, it misconceived the effect of the Railway Labor Act cases on section 441b of the Federal Election
Campaign Act and ignored competing constitutional interests as
well as national labor policy. On the basis of Street, Pipefitters,
138. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 242 (1977); Brotherhood of Ry. &
S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113,122 (1963). But see Beck v. Communications Workers
of America, No. B-76-839 (D. Md. Jan. 12, 1979) (court refused to stay procedures pending union attempts to solve internal problems).
139. See Majority and Minority Rights, supra note 81, at 411.
140. See Gabauer v. Woodcock, 594 F.2d 662, 668 n.4 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
100 S.Ct 80 (1979); Majority and Minority Rights, supra note 81, at 416 (citing Seay v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 371 F. Supp. 754, aff'd in part and reu'd in part, 533 F.2d
1126 (9th Cir. 1976)).
141. Merrill, Limitations Upon the Use of Compulsory Union Dues, 42 J . Am L. &
COM.711, 725-26 (1976).
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and Abood, and absent a clear new mandate from Congress, the
reverse political checkoff should be permitted.
Jay S. Bybee

